An ISO is a limit order designated for automatic execution in a specific market center even when another market center is publishing a better quotation, as long as the trader submits concurrent orders to the other market. We find that ISOs represent 46% of trades and 41% of volume in our sample. ISO trades have significantly larger information share despite their small trade size relative to non-ISO trades. Post trade return analysis suggests that informed institutions are the main users of ISO trades.
The study of how informed traders conduct their trading to best take advantage of short lived information is of continual interest to both practitioners and academics studying financial markets.
1 This paper examines the use of the Intermarket Sweep Orders (ISOs) and, in particular, whether ISOs are primarily used by informed or uninformed traders. While the specific attributes of ISOs are nuanced, its general properties are as follows. An ISO is a limit order designated for quick and automatic execution in a specific market center and can be executed at the target market even when another market center is publishing a better quotation.
When submitting an ISO, however, the submitting investor also needs to fulfill Reg. NMS orderprotection obligations by concurrently sending orders to other market centers with better prices.
Each order in the package must be marked as an ISO and the orders sent to the market(s) posting better prices must be of sufficient quantity to match their displayed depth at the top of the book Importantly, ISO orders are not subject to auto-routing and are identified with a trade indicator of "F" by the trade initiator.
The benefits of ISO usage include faster execution speed and the ability to capture larger counterparty depth, relative to non-ISO orders. However, the use of ISOs also entails some risks. Specifically, the ISO initiator runs the risk of liquidity depletion before the order is executed. If there is no liquidity available at the targeted market center, within the limit price, the submitted sweep order will not execute. Prices can also move against a trader between the routing decision of an ISO order and when the order actually hits the targeted market center. An 1 There is a vibrant theoretical and empirical literature modeling and documenting the various ways informed traders may attempt to hide their trades while exploiting their short-lived private information. See, for example, Kyle (1985) , Easley and O'Hara (1987) , Seppi (1990) , Foster and Viswanathan (1990) , Barclay and Warner (1993) , Chakravarty and Holden (1995) , Chakravarty (2001) , Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) , Back and Baruch (2007) , Anand and Chakravarty (2007) , and Alexander and Peterson (2007) .
ISO will execute at the targeted market, at a possibly inferior price, while a non-ISO trade would be automatically re-routed to a market center posting the best price.
Our research focuses on three primary economic concerns related to ISO trades. First, we wish to examine if the ISO exemption is widely used in the market. We find that 46% of trades are identified as ISOs, represent 41% of the 146 billion shares traded in our sample. It is clear that the new ISO orders are being extensively employed in the market. Second, we investigate the information content of ISO trades relative to the non-ISO counterpart. We find that ISO trades are more informed than non-ISO trades. While ISO trades have significantly higher effective spreads than non-ISO trades, they also have significantly lower realized spreads after 5 minutes. ISO trades also have a significantly higher information share, based on the information share method of Hasbrouck (1995) , than non-ISO trades after controlling for volume effects.
And this is true even while the average trade size of ISO trades is significantly smaller than non-ISO trades. Finally we examine if ISO trades represent an institution's attempt to subdivide large orders into many small trade lots in an attempt to hide trading intentions. The ISO exemption was instituted mainly at the request of large institutional traders to allow for efficient filling of large positions. We analyze trade-direction autocorrelation for ISO, and non-ISO transactions using the structural price formation model of Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) and find that ISOs have a significantly higher autocorrelation which implies that small ISO trades are fragmented components of large institutional orders. Overall, we conclude that informed institutions pervasively use ISOs in a post Reg NMS marketplace. ISOs may have gained so much popularity primarily because they provide a way to split orders and also allow for faster order executions in today's markets that trade at millisecond speeds.
It is, of course, possible that the ISOs, while intended for institutional traders, have the unintended consequence of being used to simply designate order flow to a particular market center. A key aspect of the ISOs is that it allows the order initiator to designate the market that the order executes in. One of the reasons why some brokers may designate order flow to a particular market is that they may receive a small compensation for such preferenced order flow, based on the assumption that such order flow is uninformed -a highly desirable feature from the market maker's perspective. Therefore, it is possible that ISOs are simply uninformed preferenced order flow? Our findings suggest the opposite. i.e., ISOs are informed transactions.
We adopt the Preferencing Measure (PM), defined as the ratio of the realized spread and the effective spread (see He, Odders-White, and Ready (2006) ), to further evaluate the execution quality of ISO trades. We find that the PM is uniformly smaller for ISO trades compared to non-ISO trades, indicating that ISO trades have better market execution quality. The better execution quality of ISO trades and lower realized spreads, relative to non-ISO trades, implies that ISO trades are typically used by the informed traders.
We contribute to the literature in several ways in addition to being the first to characterize the properties, and the use, of ISO type trades. By showing that ISO trades overall have higher information content than non-ISO trades, we underscore the potential importance of ISOs in studies of informational events like firms' quarterly earnings announcements or merger and acquisition announcements. Given the power of ISOs to obtain quicker trade executions, our findings also underscore the importance of ISO use to policy makers and those responsible for market surveillance. Close attention should be paid to changes in sweep order usageespecially prior to significant, price sensitive, information releases in the market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section I gives background and regulatory motivation for the ISO exemption to the order protection rule. Section II describes the sample, gives a brief description of the DTAQ database used in the analysis, and discusses the trade quote alignment under the current information systems used in the market. Section III presents the results of our analysis. We conclude our investigation of sweep orders in section IV.
I. The ISO mechanism.
To understand the relevance of ISOs, it is useful to consider the provisions of Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS), which was adopted by the Securities and Exchange 2 These rules were designed to modernize and strengthen the equity markets in the United States. The order protection rule establishes a price priority in the market, whereby orders submitted to the general market must be routed to the market center(s) posting the best price. ISO orders are an exemption to the Order Protection Rule of Regulation NMS and differ from non-ISO orders in that they are designated for immediate execution on the indicated market center without any re-routing. Table 1 outlines the properties of ISO trades and compares these properties with the properties of non-ISO trades.
****** Insert Table 1 about here ******
The execution venue for an ISO order is designated and is the same as the submission venue, while the execution venue for the non-ISO order can change based on the current price priority of the market, irrespective of initial submission venue. In addition, the routing of orders from one market center to another market center with price priority is not free. Currently, most 2 The formal definition of an ISO can be found in SEC Rule 600(b)(30).
exchanges charge a fee of roughly 30 cents per 100 shares routed. Since ISO trades must execute on the selected exchange, they avoid potential re-routing charges.
**** Insert Figure 1 about here **** Figure 1 demonstrates the parallel processing aspects of ISO trades. The ISO exemption allows a trader to simultaneously access the display book of all market centers and was adopted to allow institutional investors immediate access to liquidity at multiple price levels, in multiple markets, to fill large block trades with parallel submission of orders. Non-ISO trades are sequentially processed in the market, routed to the market(s) with the best quoted price, which can change during the processing of the order, causing a delay in execution. This distinction is especially important in a market condition where a single market center holds the price priority on a stock but the posted depth on this market is much smaller than the total size of the desired trade position. The ISO initiator can direct sweep orders to the price priority market that match the posted depth of the market, and simultaneously submit additional sweep orders to markets with slightly inferior, but acceptable, prices. In selecting an ISO order, the initiator can gain trade execution speed at the cost of potentially inferior trade execution prices. In this respect, the ISO order represents the most aggressive order type available in the Reg NMS market.
II. Data and sample

A. Sample and data sources
The implementation of the Order Protection Rule began on representing 197 trading days. In selecting our sample stocks, we apply the following filters.
The stock must exist in the intersection set of the CRSP and DTAQ universes. Stocks are matched between the CRSP and DTAQ databases by CUSIP. We consider only common stocks in the study, which have CRSP stock code of 10 or 11. To be considered, stocks must have a closing price greater than 10 dollars and less than 1,000 dollars on the last trading day of 2007.
We further group stocks of firms into three size classes: large, medium, and small, based on the CRSP market capitalization on the last trading day of 2007. We then take the 40 largest stocks from each group, resulting in a final sample of 120 stocks, 72 of which are listed on the NYSE and 48 on the NASDAQ. For the full sample, the average market capitalization is $50.3 Billion.
We obtain trade and quote data for our sample stocks from the DTAQ database. The DTAQ database is slightly richer than the monthly trade and quote (MTAQ) database used in most microstructure research. The DTAQ database has more extensive condition codes than the MTAQ database, contains time stamps to the millisecond, and also includes the exchange calculated NBBO (posted-NBBO hereafter) for each stock that is traded. ISO trades are identified in the DTAQ database with the condition code F.
Although the DTAQ database has time stamps for quotes and trades to the millisecond, a simple integration of trades and quotes based on this time stamp may not yield the true alignment. 3 Since trades and quotes are controlled by separate systems (SIAC and UTP), and by separate trade and quote plans with varying message bandwidths within each system, it is possible that a reporting lag will exist between trades and quotes. 4 We address this issue first because much of our subsequent analysis is based on inferring trade direction (buys and sells) and accurate trade quote alignment is critical to accurate trade inference. 3 We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue. 4 While the trade and quote data are generated by each market center, for the NYSE listed stocks, the controlling party is the Securities Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC) and for NASDAQ stocks it is NASDAQ Market Data Distribution. Each of these entities produces two plans to control for the dissemination and formatting of the data feed --a trade plan and a quote plan. For the NASDAQ listed securities, there is the UTP (unlisted trading privileges) Plan, and for the SIAC stocks there is the Consolidated Quote Plan and the Consolidated Trade Plan.
To evaluate any reporting lag between trades and quotes, we follow the basic methods developed in Bessembinder (2003b) and evaluate the price grid location of trades measured against exchange calculated NBBO quotes at several time lags prior to the time stamp of a trade.
For each stock day in the sample, we calculate the percentage of trades that are at the quote (bid or ask), outside the quote, or inside the quote for both ISO and non-ISO trades. Quote lags of 0, 10, 50, 500, 1000, and 5000 milliseconds are used to determine the quote that could potentially be in force at the time of the trade. The vast majority of trade executions occur inside the exchange computerized matching engine with no human interaction and the engine executes trades only against existing limit orders. The most appropriate quote lag should therefore be the one that produces the highest level of trades executing at the quote.
******Insert Table 2 about here ******** Panel A of Table 2 shows the price grid results for the full sample and subgroups. In panels B, C, and D, the price grid location results are separated by our firm size groupings. For the large firms in our sample, the highest percentage of ISO trades at the quotes has a value of 50 milliseconds; . At this lag, 78.3% of the trades occur at the posted NBBO, although this value is only 0.3% higher than those at the 10 millisecond lag. Non-ISO trades associated with large size firms display a peak at the quote value at a lag of 500 milliseconds, also at 78.3%, but this level is only 0.3% larger than at a lag of 50 milliseconds. Similar results for the medium and small size companies indicate that the joint peak of trades at the quotes (both ISO and non-ISO) occurs at a quote lag of 1000 milliseconds. Note that this does not imply that trades for medium and small size firms are occurring at a slower pace than those for the large size firms because the issue at hand is merely that of a delayed reporting of trades.
Since the trade and quote data plans and system infrastructure differ for the NYSE and NASDAQ listed securities, we also assess the price grid locations based on the listing exchange.
These results are shown in panel E. The joint peak in trades at the quotes for the NASDAQ stocks is found at a quote lag of 50 milliseconds while, for the NYSE listed securities, it is at 1000 milliseconds. In addition, the NASDAQ listed securities have relatively fewer trades outside the quote than the NYSE listed securities. Overall, these results indicate that there may be some misalignment in the time stamps of trades and quotes. Consequently, in the interest of thoroughness, we conduct our transaction cost analysis for quote lags of 0, 50, and 1000 milliseconds.
III. Results
We first examine to what degree the ISO exemption is used in the post Reg NMS market.
Descriptive statistics for our sample stocks and the level of ISO use are shown in Table 3 . Our sample includes 508.7 million trades producing a trading volume of 145.6 billion shares in our sample period. Of this, 46% of the trades and 41% of the volume are driven by ISO trades.
Trades and volume statistics are aggregated at the daily level and then averaged over the sample period. We also break out the trade statistics based on firm size. While there is a wide range in the market capitalization and market volume between the large, medium, and small firm size designations, we find no substantial difference in the use of ISO trades in either the percentage of trades or volume initiated by sweep orders. We also condition the descriptive statistics based on the listing exchange of the sample stock. As one might expect, the average market capitalization, the average number of trades, and the average share volume are all significantly larger for the NYSE listed securities. We also find that the ISO trades are more prevalent in the NASDAQ listed stocks. While 44% of trades in NYSE listed stocks are sweep orders, 52% of trades in NASDAQ stocks are ISOs. ISO volume, as a percentage of total volume, are also higher on the NASDAQ listed stocks, 48% versus 38% on the NYSE listed stocks.
****** Insert Table 3 about here ******
A. Trade size and distribution of ISO trades
Trade size is a key strategic decision for both informed and liquidity traders. In examining the trade size of ISOs relative to the non-ISOs, we wish to see if there are additional trade characteristics that are selected by the trade initiator. The separating equilibrium in Easley and O'Hara (1987) characterizes the intuition that informed traders will choose large size trades and pay higher spreads while uninformed liquidity based investors will choose small size trades and pay lower spreads.
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In order to examine the strategic properties of ISO trades, we compare the trade size characteristics of ISO and non-ISO trades in Table 4 . For the full sample, the average size of an ISO trade is 178.8 shares, but for a non-ISO trade, the average size is 217.3 shares. The difference of 38.4 shares is statistically significant at the 1% level. We find that ISO trades, on average, are significantly smaller than non-ISO trades, regardless of the market capitalization of each sub-sample. ****** Insert Table 4 about here ****** Table 4 also shows the median value of the time weighted average NBBO posted depth.
We provide this statistic in order to examine if the relative trade sizes of ISO versus non-ISO trades are driven by the availability of market depth (i.e., mechanical in nature) or are a strategic choice by market participants. In calculating this value, we first find the total depth posted on all 5 The stealth trading literature (see, for example, Chakravarty (2001)) argues that informed traders will choose trade sizes that are intermediate in size -not too large so as to not attract attention and not too small to unduly increase execution costs. The essence of these papers is order splitting over time. However, ISOs allow order splitting across multiple venues as well. In that sense, the findings in our paper extend the literature on the optimal order and trade size choice of informed traders.
markets that match the NBBO ask and bid prices. The time weighted average total depth (ask + bid) is then calculated for each stock day in the sample and the median of this distribution is reported. For example, at any given instant in the market for large stocks, the median expected value of the market depth is 63 round lots or 6300 shares. This measure is the 'reserve supply' in the sense that it represents the residual supply after the contemporaneous demand is satisfied.
The depth is relatively large compared to the average trade size of either ISO or non-ISO trades.
Thus, liquidity supply is not a binding constraint for either the ISO or non-ISO trades and the choice appears to be driven by other strategic considerations.
***** Insert Table 5 about here *****
In Table 5 we evaluate the frequency distribution of ISO and non-ISO trades. We count the number of trades, conditioned on trade size, for the sample period and then generate a cumulative distribution of the results. While we would wish to select a relatively narrow band of trades in order to better quantify the trade size distribution, odd lot trades do represent a small proportion of the overall trading volume in the markets of about 0.5% and should be accounted for. 6 We therefore select break points that bracket round lot trade sizes. Specifically, we consider trade groupings of <150, 151-250, 251-350, 351-450, 451-650, and >650 shares.
Panel A of Table 5 
B. Are ISO trades informed or preferenced?
Since ISOs are by rule limited to executing in a specified market, they could simply represent preferencing agreements for order flow and, therefore, have little or no incremental informational content over the non-ISO transactions. In this section, we investigate the use of ISOs as order preferencing tools by evaluating the transaction costs associated with ISO and non-ISO trades.
To assess whether ISOs have features similar to uniformed preferenced order flow or informed institutional order flow, we must first infer the buy or sell direction of each trade in our database. To do so, we adopt the trade inference method proposed by Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000) . Specifically, the inference is conducted against the posted NBBO, which is included with the DTAQ database. We follow the methods outlined in the previous section and conduct trade inferences based on quote lags of 0, 50, and 1000 milliseconds.
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Effective half spreads are defined as ( )
where D it is the trade direction indicator that equals 1 for buys and -1 for sells , P it is the trade price, and M it is the exchange posted-NBBO mid-point. The realized half spread is calculated as
is the prevailing posted-NBBO quote mid-point 5 minutes after the trade. If there are less than 5 minutes left before the market close (4:00 pm EST), the prevailing NBBO quote at the close of the market is used. Following He, Odders-White, and Ready (2006), the Preferencing Measure 7 Additional quote lags were analyzed with identical results to those presented and are available from the authors upon request. We limit the presented results to conserve space.
(PM) is defined as the ratio of realized spread to effective spread. The advantage of the PM measure, over effective and realized spreads, is that it controls for the information asymmetry that underlies the order initiation. This allows the PM measure to be used for comparisons between stocks and also between market centers; comparisons that are problematic when using the realized and effective spreads by themselves. If ISO trades are dominated by preferenced order flow then these trades should have a higher preferencing measure compared to the non-ISO trades. On the other hand, if ISOs are used primarily by the informed traders, their preferencing measure should be lower than that for the non-ISO trades. 
C. Serial correlation and estimated spreads
It is the large institutional orders that are likely to be broken up into small ISO trades and parallel processed through the market in order to quickly capture counter party depth and minimizing price impact. The preceding analysis on spreads and preferencing does not directly take into account the impacts of the serial correlation of trades --buys followed by more buys and sells followed by more sells --which is likely if ISO trading is dominated by institutions.
The positive serial correlation of trades can lead to an overestimation of the effective spreads for ISO trades. In order to estimate the trading costs associated with ISO versus non-ISO transactions in the face of significant serial correlation (or, trade persistence) likely to be associated with the ISO transactions, we adopt the methodology developed by Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997), hereafter MRR. 12 In paticular, the parameters of interest, derived from the MRR method, are S , the implied spread, E S , the effective spread, r , the fraction of implied spread attributed to asymmetric information, and  (Rho), the serial correlation parameter of signed order flow. If Table 7 .
************* Insert Table 7 about Here************
The regression and parameter estimates are very similar between the 0 millisecond lag results and the variable quote lag results. We confine our discussion to the variable lag results.
Our first question is whether ISO trades have a higher serial correlation of signed trades than the 12 MRR assume that order flow follows a general Markov chain process and that it is the unexpected order flow component that is a surprise conveying a permanent impact on the true asset value. In our case, we estimate this unexpected component of the ISO versus non-ISO transactions.
non-ISO trades, consistent with the intuition that institutional traders might be breaking up order flow with ISO trades. We find that rho (  ), the serial correlation of order flow, is significantly higher for ISO trades than for non-ISO trades for all firm sizes included in our sample, although the magnitude of this difference decreases with firm size. This finding supports our contention that ISO trades are driven by institutional traders breaking up large orders into small ISO transactions. Our results also indicate, that once serial correlation of trades is taken into consideration, both the implied spread, S, and the implied effective spread, S E , are lower for ISO trades than for non-ISO trades. In other words, ISO trades may not only allow traders to capture counterparty depth quicker, they may also have lower execution cost than non-ISO trades. The last parameter we consider is r, the ratio of the implied spread attributable to asymmetric information. Uniformly we find that a greater proportion of the implied spread is driven by asymmetric information for ISO trades than for the non-ISO trades. For example, we show that, for large stocks, the proportion of the spread attributable to asymmetric information for ISO trades is 0.899 or roughly 90% while, for non-ISO trades, the proportion is only 0.343, or about 34%. These results strengthen our primary assertion that ISO orders represent a popular trading choice for informed traders in a post Reg NMS market.
D. Information share of ISO trades
While the lower realized spreads of ISO trades imply that these trades are, ex-post, more informed than non-ISO trades, a key effect of informed traders in the market is to improve the price discovery process. If ISO trades are dominated by informed institutional traders, then we should expect to see greater price discovery associated with these transactions. To address the issue of relative price discovery between ISO and non-ISO trades, we turn to the Information Shares method developed by Hasbrouck (1995) . In particular, Hasbrouck's method uses a vector autoregressive error correction model to decompose the random walk contribution from each price vector into the efficient price evolution process. In essence, if the price of non-ISO trades reacts to the price change of ISO trades, then ISO trades have a higher contribution to the price discovery process.
Operationally, we use the last transaction price of ISO (non-ISO) trades for each second.
The use of transaction prices follows the application in Hasbrouck (2003) We formally test the implications of Figure 2 in Table 8 . In introducing the information share method, Hasbrouck (1995) finds that the price discovery process is under represented in the regional exchanges because the proportion of the information share is well below the percentage of the transaction volume executed on these exchanges. We formalize this intuition by conducting a paired t-test comparing the proportion of ISO trade volume to the information share of the ISO trades. Each sample point in the test represents one stock-day of our sample.
Results are presented, conditional on the market capitalization grouping of the firms in our trades have the largest impact on the price discovery process. In our analysis, smaller ISO trades appear to fulfill a similar role. These results hold for each of the market capitalization groups in our study, although the differences are smaller for smaller firms, and also when the results are partitioned by the listing exchange.
****** Insert Table 9 about here ******
E. Intraday variations
Up to this point we have shown that ISO trades are widely used in the market, have better trade execution quality, and carry significantly more information than non-ISO trades. In addition, from the MRR regression, we have shown that ISO trades likely represent order splitting of much larger order positions into multiple ISO trades of small sizes. We next examine the intraday usage of ISOs.
To conduct the intraday analysis we divide the trading day into 78 five minute segments.
Since the presented evidence indicates that ISO trades are components of significantly larger orders, we expect that ISO use will have a positive serial correlation. After all, it will take time to fill a large order with an average trade size of only 179 shares. We therefore include the percent of ISO volume traded in the three previous periods as a determinant of the current period ISO use. Among the several advantages of ISO trades is the ability to parallel process order flow through multiple exchanges simultaneously as shown in Figure 1 , even if the posted liquidity on some exchanges is outside the best prices. In order to capture the market conditions that allow for the parallel processing ability of ISO trades we define the variable Brdth. Brdth i,t is the time weighted average number of market centers that offer depth at, or within, the flicker quote as a percentage of market centers that can quote for the stock. 16 A quote is at, or within, the flicker if the quote price (ask or bid) is equal to or better than the least aggressive NBBO ask or bid quote over the previous one second. 17 The amount of posted depth is another factor that could impact the choice between ISO and non-ISO trades. High posted depth at a market center that matches the best price of the market might lead to the use of non-ISO trades to access the large liquidity reservoir. To examine this possible determinant, we include the peak level of quoted depth, PkDpth. For each market center we calculate the time weighted depth (ask+bid) that matches the NBBO for each time segment. PkDpth is then the single largest time weighted depth of the market centers contained in the DTAQ database for each of the 78 period of the day. Also included is the time weighted relative spread, based on the NBBO quote, Rsprd, and the NBBO quote mid-point volatility for the period. To investigate time of day effect of ISO use we also include TimeDum;
intraday dummies for each ½ hour of the trading day with the middle period 8 dropped from the 16 Market breadth has also been examined in the form of quote competitiveness in Bessembinder (2003a) . 17 Rule 611 restricts trade throughs, however, with the speed at which trading occurs currently, measuring trade throughs based on an instantaneous price in the market is problematic. The SEC therefore adopted the flickering quotes rule whereby trade throughs are measured against the least aggressive ask and bid prices over the previous one second of trading. All liquidity posted within the flicker quotes is available for immediate execution without violating the order protection rule. 
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 9 .
**** Insert Table 9 Our third specification, S3, includes our proxies for market liquidity conditions that impact the selection of ISO trades by order initiators. The coefficient for Brdth is negative and significant indicating that ISO use increases as market breadth narrows. It is our position that the most liquid markets are those with narrow spreads, large posted depth, and many market centers posting liquidity at the best prices in the markets. Under these conditions, informed traders can self route non-ISO trades to these market centers that will be executed because all market centers have price priority. However, when markets breadth narrows, the amount of protected liquidity available for immediate execution decreases. 18 Informed institutional traders with large share demand turn to the more aggressive ISO trade type to simultaneously access posted liquidity that is at, and outside of, protected prices in order to meet their demand. In short, our findings indicate that traders become more aggressive as markets narrow. The coefficient for PkDpth is negative and significant for the S3 fixed effects regression. We interpret our finding as follows.
When a market center posts a large reservoir of liquidity, informed institutional traders can access that liquidity using non-ISO orders, which, based on our results, convey less information to the market.
The last two liquidity variables that we consider are the relative spread variable, Rsprd, and the NBBO quote mid-point volatility, MpVar. We find that, as spreads widen, the use of ISO transactions decreases. As spreads widen the cost of demanding immediacy increases, but the costs of reaching additional liquidity past best prices with ISO trades increase even more, curtailing the benefits of ISO trades by increasing the associated costs. Although ISO use decreases as spreads widen, ISO use increases as quote mid-point volatility increase. As quote mid-points begin to trend away from the average, informed traders face a choice of trading now at known prices, or waiting to trade later, hoping that the price trend will mean revert back to the average. Our results indicate that informed traders prefer to trade now, opting for the aggressive ISO trades, and seizing liquidity at current prices, before prices trend away to their new mean values based on new information.
We also estimate specification three, S3, for each individual stock in the sample. We then present the average of each of the coefficients from the 120 regressions and test if the average estimates are statistically different from zero. The results are shown in Table 9 
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the properties of the new Intermarket Sweep Order (ISO), an important exemption to the Order Protection Rule of Regulation NMS, Rule 611. We find that the ISO transactions are associated with both statistically and economically significant lower realized (higher effective) spreads when compared to non-ISO trades and that they are not likely to be preferenced trades originating from uninformed traders. We also find that ISO trades dominate the information share component of the efficient price as estimated by the Hasbrouck We find that ISO use is lower at the front end of the trading day and picks up towards the back end of it. In addition, ISO use decreases when spreads widen but increases as the volatility of the quote mid-point increases. Our results also imply that when a single market center offers a large liquidity reservoir, traders are more likely to select non-ISO orders. Likewise, when the market narrows, i.e., fewer market centers offering competitive prices, traders shift to ISO transactions in order to tap into liquidity outside of the best prices in order to fill demand.
While the current research takes a modest first step in understanding the usage of ISOs, future research should examine the role of ISOs in periods surrounding corporate events such as earnings announcements or mergers and acquisitions and market events such as the flash crash or other periods of extreme liquidity crisis in order to better understand investor behavior around such events. At a minimum, our analysis implies that future empirical and theoretical research will need to consider the potential usage of ISOs as a trading strategy by informed traders.
FIGURE 2 Time Series of Information Ratio
Time series plot of the information ratio for each trade type, Non-ISO and ISO. The information ratio is defined as the information share of a given trade type divided by the volume share of that trade type. We plot the equally weighted average information ratio for each day in our sample. Sample stocks are selected based on the following criteria. First, the stocks must exist in the intersection set of the DTAQ and CRSP databases. The stock must have a closing price greater than ten dollars and less than 1,000 dollars on the last trading day of 2007 and must be a common stock (CRSP share code 10 or 11). Stocks are then grouped as large, medium, or small based on market capitalization. The top 40 stocks, based on market capitalization, from each grouping form the sample of 120 stocks considered in this study. ISO trades are identified in the DTAQ database as condition code F. 30, 2008 . Market capitalization values are based on the last trading day of 2007. Sample stocks are selected based on the following criteria. First, the stocks must exist in the intersection set of the DTAQ and CRSP databases. The stock must have a closing price greater than ten dollars and less than 1,000 dollars on the last trading day of 2007 and must be a common stock (CRSP share code 10 or 11). Stocks are then grouped as large, medium, or small based on market capitalization. The top 40 stocks, based on market capitalization, from each of the 3 groupings form the sample of 120 stocks considered in this study. K-S test is the p-value of a KolmogorovSmirnov distribution test where the null hypothesis is that the distributions of ISO and non-ISO trades are equal. We reject this hypothesis for the full and all sub samples. Table 7 MRR regression results We analyze the implied spreads of ISO and non-ISO trades using the method of Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) . They propose estimating the following regression:
,  is a constant (drift) parameter, and x t is a trade direction indicator. In particular, x t is 1 if the trade is buyer initiated (at or above the NBBO ask), -1 if the trade is seller initiated (at or below the NBBO bid), and 0 if the trade is inside the NBBO quote. The implied spread, S, can this be consistently estimated as Table 8 Information share evaluation The table contains the evaluation of the impact of ISO trades on the price discovery process using the information share method of Hasbrouck (1995 Hasbrouck ( , pp 1182 . The method uses a vector autoregressive error correction model to decompose the random walk contribution from each price vector of a two price channel input into the overall efficient price evolution process. The mean information share is the contribution of ISO trades in the overall variance of ISO and non-ISO trades. We conduct a paired t-test comparing the proportion of information share to the proportion of ISO trade volume. Each sample point in the test represents one of the 23,622 stock days in the sample. In conducting the information share analysis, we use the last ISO (non-ISO) trade price for each second containing one or more trades. Information shares are estimated for each stock day in the sample. We present the mean trade size for ISO (non-ISO) trades used in the information share analysis. We also conduct a paired t-test comparing the trade size of ISO and non-ISO trades included in the information share analysis. We first calculate the average trade size for each trade type on each stock day in the sample. The paired t-test is then conducted on the resulting time series. 
